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i{t•gions and regionalism had a great impact on developments in nineteenth-
' ·t•ntury Germany. The century began with a genuine territorial revolution in 
Pebruary 1803 that ended the iridependent history of hundreds of regional 
states and brought their number down to 34. After several hundred years of 
rl'lative continuity this was a clear break with the past. Bringing the number 
t ,r German states down further to 27 and taking away much of their indepen-
dence with the unification of Germany in 1871 was then a comparatively 
small step. What had begun in the late eighteenth century- the dissoci-
ation of territory and political power- reached a certain climax in 1803. 
Early-modern small state particularism, nevertheless, had a Iasting impact 
on regionalism as well as nationalism. Deprived of their political power the 
old German states still fastered a sense of the 'federative nation' (föderative 
Nation). 1 Regional identity was therefore still a veritable cultural and political 
rorce which could support a call for federalism. 
Regions could be coextensive with a state, but also exist below the 
states and between them. A good example is the Palatinate. Since the late 
eighteenth century it belonged politically and administratively to Bavaria. 
Culturally and to a certain extent politically, however, representatives of the 
Palatinate kept their distance fram the capital Munich. In this the Palatinate 
did not stand alone. Many sub-state regionalisms explicitly or implicitly 
referred to their political borders before the French Revolution. Regions 
like Lower Franconia araund Würzburgor Westfalen araund Münster had 
been former bishoprics that had lost their political independence under 
Napoleon. Throughout the nineteenth century they were respectively part 
of Bavaria and Prussia, but nevertheless kept a sense of distinctiveness in 
relation to other regions and particularly to their new administrative centres 
in Murrich and Berlin. The new Bavarian state and particularly Baden inher-
ited hundreds of ecclesiastical and imperial territories in 1803. The citizens 
of these dissolved entities experienced their political transfer to new author-
ities as a loss. The end of the ecclesiastical territories, for instance, resulted 
93 
94 Continental Empires 
in the disappearance of social welfare and elementary education in many 
parts of the new Bavaria, where these functions had been administered by 
monasteries. 
This was quite different in the second wave of territorial reorganisation 
in 1866 when the Prussian annexation of Hesse-Kassel, Nassau, the city of 
Frankfurt and the kingdom of Hannover was, despite some resistance, wel· 
comed and experienced as a net gain. The dynasties in these states had nol 
based their autocratic regimes on the loyalty of their people and were nol 
held in high esteem, and the new administration trled to maintain as many 
local institutions and legal provisions as it could. As a result, the elections 
of 1867 in these new Prussian territories were won by the National-Liberals, 
the party of Bismarck. The annexations of 1866 did not, therefore, result in 
a fierce oppositional movement, and only rarely did a sub-state regionalism 
develop afterwards in these areas. 
How can the regionalisms in the German 'Länder' (e.g. Bavaria) and on 
a sub-state Ievel (e.g. Franconia) theoretically be understood? They do not 
relate to each other as politicisation and de-politicisation or as political and 
cultural regionalism. On the one hand, sub-state regionalisms were cultural 
as weil as political. They preserved a memory of historical statehood, in 
the Palatinate ended by the defeat of its 'winter-king' Frederic V in 1620 
at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, in Lower Franconia finishing in 
the baroque era and so on. They all had their historical memory of political 
and cultural importance. These memories generated a sense of uniqueness 
and independence even after their statehood had disappeared. During the 
Weimar Republic the strength of these sub-state regionalisms could still be 
seen in the election results, when former Catholic territories like Friesoythe 
and Cloppenburg - then a part of predominantly Protestant Prussia - voted 
overwhelmingly Catholic. 
On the other side, regionalisms coinciding with a state like Baväria Ol' 
Saxony were not simply nationalisms writ small. Their political utopia lay 
with the monarchical order and not with the people's sovereignty or the 
nation-state. If Bavarian patriots referred to the Bavarian nation, they did 
so in a completely different manner than the Prussian National-Liberals. 
Not the political ideals of a democratic and constitutional nation-state but 
1 rather the monarchy or even the dynasty - as in Bavaria the 700-year-old 
Wittelsbach dynasty or in Saxony the 800-year-old Wettiner dynasty- pro-
vided continuity and identity for these state regionalisms. The participa-
tory character of liberal nationalism was a challenge for regionalisms of 
all sorts. 
Regionalisms in the German Confederation and later in the German 
Reich had therefore specific relationships with the states, which set them 
apart from regionalisms in other European nation-states. Two characteris· 
tics made the German case terminology specific and differentiated it from 
developments elsewhere: 
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I. German history at the end of the nlnete~eenth century knew two forms 
of regionalism: first that of the rising miüddle-sized states, like Bavaria, 
Württemberg and Saxony. Their regionali:lism was old ( except for Baden, 
which did not exist as such before 1809:,9) and had always had a state, 
but their societies had been totally reconSlstituted in the Napoleonic era. 
This kind of regionalism was partly defeJensive against the encroaching 
nation-state, partly offensive, since it fouught for the loyalty of its cit-
izens. The other form was constituted 1 by sub-state regionalisms like 
those in Franconia or the Palatinate, terdritories that had been incorpo-
rated into the new middle-sized states bbut also into Prussia. Sub-state 
regionalism therefore refers in the Germann case to these type of sub-state 
regionalisms, not to sub-(nation-)state regigionalisms on a central German 
Ievel. German regionalisms were thus != part of a multi-level political 
system. 
:~ ?. This was facilitated by the German type ~ of cooperative federalism that 
developed after the unsuccessful revolutionn of 1848. lt reaffirmed the role 
of the state monarchies au-cf did not rephlace them by a single national 
identity. The cooperative federalism stipnulated that the federal legisla-
tion of the Reich was executed in practice:e by the administrations of the 
states. Their administrative function was 1< kept in place. The regionalisms 
of the states had therefore no incenthive to being particularist, the 
sub-state regionalisms were nationalist r<rather than secessionist. lf the 
Palatinate went against Bavaria, it was v;with a pro-German nationalist 
intention. 
'I The references to history, historical statehoood and monarchies were typical 
lor state-regionalism up until the 1870s. That t did not mean that the glory of 
1 he region for them lay only in the past and t that regionalism could be asso-
c l'iated with traditionalism. Quite to the contltrary: Abigail Green has shown 
i 11 her book Fatherlands that the monarchs iiin Hannover and Württemberg 
lostered a sense of monarchical loyalty throxmgh embracing institutions of 
r modernity: for example, railroads or public fe~stivities even before 1871. That 
s set it apart from the other dynasties that Prus1ssia put an end to in 1866. The 
1= princes of Nassau and particularly of Hesse-e-Kassel, as weil as the leading 
e dites of the Free City of Frankfurt had stea<adfastly rejected economic and 
!= political reforms prior to the annexation. Th'heir subjects did not nurture a 
f positive memory of their rulers, and they didd not hold any affection for the 
i i ndependence of these states. 2 The distinctioon drawn between cultural and 
I political regionalisms in Germany can therefo'ore only be a gradual one. Polit-
ical regionalism generally aimed at building uup a cultural base while cultural 
r regionalism had in many cases a memory of r political independence. 
What makes a region a region? It is not)t simply a certain number of 
s square miles or a specific space. It is a socio-~-spatial phenomenon in which 
t lerritorially linked identities were connecteted to other factors, of which 
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the political is the most obvious.3 Govermments administer spatially based 
regimes and try to create loyalty to them. Economic links can also refer 
to a spatial object. The widening of trade networks went along with a 
broader worldview. Nation-building alway~s implied market-building. Econ-
omy, transport and mobility inform spatial experiences and practices, which 
result in new social net:works. Mack Walker identified the 'movers and doers' 
in the Bavarian home t:own of Weissenburg as those most sympathetic to the 
national cause.4 Religion also defined in- amd out-group orientations, which 
implied a spatial and regional dimension .. This could be seen best in the 
years of the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf In tlhe 1870s, part of the resistance in 
the Rhineland against the Kulturkampf legüslation resulted from the conflict 
between the Catholic Rhenish periphery ;and the political and Protestant 
centre in Berlin. 
This spatial dimension cannot be measmred in square miles. It was a pro-
cess of identification t:hat held a social gr1oup tagether and reproduced it. 
Regionalism is an iden tification that tri es ito integrate a given social group 
through an abstract idea of what the regionl is. The region is not a geograph-
ical entity but rather a socio-spatial conceptt that wins its legitimacy through 
the persuasive force of geography, that is, the presumption that it is natu-
ral and self-evident and does not aspire to follow an abstract ideal. It is a 
form of abstract integration, just as the nattion is a form of abstract integra-
tion.5 The resulting community is an 'imagined community', where similar 
mechanisms come into play as with the nattion and nationalism.6 
Benedict Anderson has argued that naticonalism sprang out of an idea of 
empty time. Print capitalism and the gremt narratives of the nation filled 
this empty time. The same can be said ab:>out empty space. In France the 
revolutionaries abolished the historical negions and replaced them with 
83 departments, which were constructed on a rationaHst basis and were 
only remotely associated with the regions; before 1789. The French Revo-
lution thus created an empty space, which it filled with the new spatial 
construction of the departments. 7 
In 1871 with the founding of the Gernnan Empire regionalism did not 
come to an end and vvas not dissolved im the nation-state. Through eco-
nomic, administrative and cultural reformts regional actors in the German 
Bundesstaaten kept up with the wave of reforms and legislative change on 
national Ievel. School reforms and new sclnoolbooks tried to imbue a sense 
of regional and of national pride into the <Children. Administrative reforms 
allowed for new businesses and mobility. <Cities like Frankfurt, Cologne or 
Munich epitomised modernisation.8 This form of regionalism presented 
modernisation in its purest and most sirmple form: massive progress in 
hygiene and sewage systems, more energy through electrification, disposal 
of waste, urban planning and new schools; and universities. That was gen-
erally the agenda of the small states and tlne cities. They were modernising 
themselves, which effectively meant a (re-)imvention of regionalism. Regions 
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were able to adapt to the national and modernising environment. They were 
not simple remnants of tradition or leftovers from pre-modern times.9 
Regionalism as weil as nationalism and localism were thoroughly rede-
lined during the German Empire, broadly speaking between 1867 and 1914. 
Whereas small state regionalism and German nationalism had been diver-
gent until the 1870s, several political mechanisms, cultural experiences and 
narratives resulted in convergence of regionalism and nationalism, begin-
ning with the elites and then araund 1890 for the broad masses. Here we 
can find an important caesura. The different modes of inclusion require a 
discussion of the different uses of history, politics and culture. In the follow-
ing remarks, three overlapping dimensions of this shift from exclusion to 
inclusion in Germany will be sketched out. r 
Regionalism, federalism and political integration 
Gerhard Lehmbruch has discerned at least four ways to cope with con-
llicts between the local and Afie national in the nation-state. First, party 
competition can nationalise the existing conflicts' and thereby transform 
regional conflicts into national ones. Salutions tö similar problems faced 
by different regions would thereby be sought not where they began in the 
regions, but in the parliament and other national institutions. Second, an 
authoritarian monarchy or executive could try to use its power to subdue 
discord and thereby resolve conflicts. Third, systems characterised by a pro-
portional government and parity in decision-making could solve conflicts 
and secure at the same time national unity. Finally federalism was the ulti-
mate mechanism for conflict resolution. 10 The latter was particularly the case 
in Germany. 
Until 1848 federalism was generally seen as the way to organise democ-
racy in a territorial state with political subunits. It was an emancipatory way 
to construct a German republic (Föderativrepublik) and thereby incorporate 
the existing monarchies. Federalist authors looked to the US constitution of 
1787 and the 'Federalist Papers' in their attempt to construct a democratic 
nation-state based on a territorially divided area. These sources provided a 
strategy for left-wing democratic nationalists to transform territorial monar-
chies into a democratic state, where the rights of the individual states would 
be secured and the executive branch would be democratically legitimised. 
The impact of the Federalist Papers was particularly strong in Germany, but 
was also influential in Italy and Switzerland.11 Generally speaking, federalism 
was a driving force behind the national democratic movement. 
This changed in 1848. The revolutionofthat year put an end to this more 
left-wing driven federalism in central Europe, although it survived in south-
ern Europe and in Switzerland. In central Europe federalism was fully rein-
vented. The counter-revolutionary affirmation of monarchical sovereignty 
in 1848/1849 made it clear that any future German nation-state would not 
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be a republic, nor would it reform or transform the existing monarchies. 
It became clear that the federal scheme for the future nation-state had to 
include and secure the existing states and monarchies. The Göttingen law 
professor Georg Waitz and other moderate liberals now made the German 
states and their monarchies the cornerstones of a future German state 
('Bundesstaat'). Waitz' theory of a divided sovereignty between the member 
states and the federative state worked with the underlying assumption that 
federalism was no Ionger a transformative, but rather an affirmative polit-
ical strategy. It was no Ionger to be found on the political left, but on the 
political right. 
This had lasting consequences. As a result the democratic and socialist tra-
ditions in Germany became unitary and opposed to federalism, as they have 
remained more or less until today. Their opposition to federalism datesback 
to the socialist perception oftheGerman nation-state as established in 1871. 
For them it was a 'Fürstenstaat' and not a 'Volksstaat' as they had wanted. For 
socialists federalism became aligned with reactionary and anti-democratic 
politics. In opposition to the tradition of the Federalist Papers, a demo-
cratic state required for them a unitary conception of popular sovereignty to 
counter the anti-democratic politics of the nobility, which had its stranghold 
in the states.12 
There was indeed ample evidence in the constitution of 1871 andin the 
attitude of Bismarck and his peers for an anti-democratic use of federalism, 
although on the surface this was not the case. 13 The federal system of 
1871 came with a dual chamber system. The national parliament was based 
on popular sovereignty, with 382 members of parliament, representing all 
41 millionGermans within its borders. In this it followed the electoral sys-
tem introduced for the Reichstag of the German Northern Confederation 
in 1867 in which for the first time in German history all men over 25 
could vote on an equal basis. The democratic principle included in uni-
versal suffrage was thus implemented in Germany much earlier than in 
Britain or Italy. A national party system soon developed afterwards with 
four parties, representing conservatism, Catholicism, liberalism and social-
ism, which became typical for most nation-states. The fierce conflicts of the 
1870s drove Catholics and socialists from all areas into organising their own 
national parties. The national parliament thus united people on the level of 
the nation-state. 
This did not mean that the democratically elected Reichstag had its way. 
The upper house or Bundesrat, in which the 25 German states were, with the 
exception of Prussia, more or less represented according to the size of their 
population, had undue influence. The integration of the smaller states had 
been made easier through the constitutional provision that Prussia, with 
two-thirds of the German population, had only 17 of the 58 seats in the 
upper house. To pass legislation Prussia therefore needed the votes of at 
least two other, mostly southern German kingdoms. In addition Bavaria and 
. I 
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Wiirttemberg were given exemptions from certain specific national legisla-
lion.14 The Bundesrat was much more than a second chamber. The Reich 
was governed constitutionally through the Prussian crown, which acted as 
1 ile head of the Bundesrat. Consequently the national parliament could not 
.Hidress the government directly. The government was hidden behind the 
ll'deral structure. To attack the government meant effectively to criticise the 
Bundesrat itself. Criticism of Chancellor Bismarck amounted automatically 
lo criticism of 25 monarchs and city governments. And that was exactly 
ilow it was meant to work. The Bundeskanzler - de facto the head of the 
/:( 1vernment - was constitutionally nothing more than the secretary to the 
ilead of the Bundesrat. Federalism thus made ministerial responsibility to 
ll1e elected national parliament non-existent. Besides the chancellorship, the 
IIIOSt important office in the German Empire was the Prussian foreign min-
isler, who negotiated compromises with other states directly. Between 1867 
.111d 1890 both positions where held by one and the same person: Otto von 
1\ismarck. 
Here 1890 was a turning pointThe nationaldimensionwas strengthened 
111 rough being democratised. After his forced resignafion in 1890 Bismarck 
I 1ecame a mythological figure. Being sneered at by 'liberals, Catholics and 
socialists when he was chancellor between 1871 and 1890, he made a stun-
rting career as 'Reichsgründer' and 'the Iron Chancellor' after his departure. 
l'art of this retrospective celebration was a way to criticise his successor, 
Wilhelm II, but more importantly he could function as a symbol of national 
integration beyond the dynasties, since Bismarck was not a member of a 
ruling family. Monuments and associations, student fraternities and yearly 
lestivities were devoted to Bismarck. His rise to mythological status after 
1890 appealed to his various and different roles. Bismarck was perceived 
as fully Prussian and conservative as well as fully national and German. 
ln terms of social anthropology he functioned as a 'trickster'. In the 1850s 
ile had been a staunch conservative opposing the liberals wherever he could, 
while in the 1860s he had fought the constitutional conflict as prime min-
ister for the crown against a liberal majority in the lower house. On the 
other hand he was invested with national characteristics: 'Reichsgründer' 
and almost the personification of the Reich for 20 years. Commemorating 
ßismarck bridged the gap between regionalism and nationalism in a conser-
vative way. Through the memory of Bismarck the German nation-state at 
all its levels could be brought into one narrative that stood for the stability 
of that complex of opposites by bringing together two systems of conflict 
resolution: nationalism and federalism.15 
Transforming regionalism into federalism was particularly attractive to 
conservative elites. This became clear early on when Bavarian patriots -
otherwise vehemently opposed to Prussia, Protestantism, liberalism and gen-
erally the North - had to decide whether Bavaria would join the German 
Reich or whether it would stay outside. Earlier elections had resulted in 
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a majority of Catholic patriots in the Bavarian diet, mostly opposed to 
national unification under Prussian auspices. In the final debate in Munich 
on 21 January 1871, however, many patriots joined forces with the liber• 
als and voted for Bavarian entry into the Reich. They argued that staying 
out of the Reich would mean disintegration, since parts of Bavaria - the 
Palatinate and parts of Franconia - were sympathetic to the new national 
solution. Ironically it was their patriotism that made them vote for and 
not against Bavaria's entry. 16 We can see the same arguments being used 
in relation to the position of Eastern European states after the end of the 
Cold War. The only way to keep political and territorial integrity under a 
regime of globalised markets and unstable democratic Institutions was enter• 
ing the EU. Seen from this viewpoint, surrendering sovereignty to the EU 
amounts to 'the rescue of the nation-state'. The entry of all of Bavaria or all 
of Württemberg into the German Empire similarly amounted to the rescue 
of its territorial integrity and its statehoodY 
As a result of this form of conflict resolution the relations between the 
Reich and the German states (Bundesstaaten) were excellent. They were the 
political capital of the government. The disadvantages lay with those, who 
wanted to strengthen the national parliament or even democratic govern· . 
ment. As a result of the loss of influence at the national Ievel, liberals turned 
towards local government where they often obtained, for instance in Berlin1 
Frankfurt am Main, Cologne or Munich, a dominant role in city govern· 
ment. 18 The biggest disadvantage in terms of the disintegrative impact lay 
in the alienation of the democratic left. Whereas federalism was able to 
include the regions, the states and their monarchies, it alienated at the 
same time the German Social Democratic Party (SPD: Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) and its allies. That came tobe feit sharply after 1890, 
The federal Institutions were used to coordinate the anti-socialist laws 
('Sozialistengesetze') effectively. At local Ievel bureaucrats coordinated their 
anti-socialist zeal effectively over state borders. Federalism here provided the 
institutional backing for the coordinated fight against socialism.19 
Whereas federalism clearly was able to bridge the divide between the 
regional and the national Ievel in the 1870s and 1880s, it was instrumen- · ..
tal in sharpening the social and political divide between the governmental 
parties and the left. After 1890 much of its regional integrative impact was 
achieved through antisocialism. 
Regionalism and culturalism 
A second form of regional inclusion in the national narrative was culturalism 
or the cultural Interpretation of regional identity. In the German Confeder-
ation between 1815 and 1866, regionalism had a clear political dimension. 
Thirty-five German states gave political weight and decision-making power 
to their often newly created territories, which were in many cases assernblies 
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'ol smaller units that had possessed political sovereignty before 1803. The 
··l.lll' bureaucracies and monarchies of, for example, Bavaria, Württemberg 
.IIHI Baden were fairly successful in creating forms of state loyalty through 
·.d woling and the public representation of the monarchies. Schools in 
llavaria, after 1848 under Maximilian II, brought tagether various regional 
~:r1 111ps in Bavarian society in a sense of loyalty: the Upper Bavarians, 
IIH' Lower Bavarians and the Franconians from Lower, Middle and Upper 
1:ranconia, the Swabians and the Palatinate.20 This loyalty had a political 
lrr1pact, since it strengthened the ruling bureaucratic-monarchical condo-
r~rinium. Political regionalism and state sovereignty were thereby culturally 
rrr1derpinned. 
i\fter the founding of the empire in 1871, this dynamic changed. 
< :trlturalism essentially no Ionger strengthened the individual states, but the 
11ation-state. It worked towards a depoliticisation of regional identity. The 
'trltural reinterpretation of Bavaria, for instance, focused on Bavarianness 
I wyond the political activities of a Bavarian state. The new schoolbooks, 
public festivities and memor.i:ai activities all showcased Bavarian identity 
111 rough history. But the history they connected 'with Bavaria was now 
tllltural not political. It encompassed costumes· and architecture, land-
\cape and mountains, the monastedes and agriculture and above all the 
tnonarchy. A widely distributed Saxon schoolbook had a section on the 
slate as a subsection under 'Heimat'. 21 Saxony was included into the Reich 
II! rough a combination of the 'narrower fatherland' (engeres Vaterland) 
;md the 'wider fatherland' (weiteres Vaterland). Generally the attributes of 
ille state became connected with the national Ievel, whereas the region 
ltad cultural and emotional qualities. One of the most important con-
rtections between localism, regionalism and national identity was made 
illrough the 'Christian elementary school' (christliche Volksschule). It couched 
adherence to a national society in Christian terms with the regions as 
pillars of that specific German morality and domesticity ('Innerlichkeit'). 
( :hristian morality was attributed to Germany. The German Protestant tradi-
lion threw its moral weight behind cultural nation-building. The same held 
lrue for Christmasthat was made into a holiday that conveyed a sense of 
Cermanness.22 
An essential part of culturalism was the historicisation of regional identity. 
ln all parts of Germany historical associations (Geschichtsvereine) sprang up 
and cultivated historical memory.23 Socially the educated bourgeoisie had 
lhe upper hand in these associations. They gave national values a histori-
cal basis. Regional history, such as Bavarian or Saxon history, was narrated 
in a national context. That meant, for instance, emphasising the Bavarian 
effort against the Hungarian Invasions in the tenth century or the Saxon 
efforts against presumably Slavic incursions since the eleventh century. 
1-Iistoricising regional identity first meant reifying the actors as Bavarians 
or Saxons and the new regions as the ( only) Bavaria or Saxony, and so forth, 
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as if something like that had existed before the nineteenth century. For the 
readers of historical narratives regional identity therefore seemed natural. 
It had a Iangue duree of at least a thousand years, given that the Middle Ages 
now rase to praminence in historical imagination. Second, the historical 
associations narrated national history fram its margins. Regions and ethnic· 
ities at the edge of the Holy Roman (presumably German) Empire were the 
central actors in defending it. The periphery therefore stood at the centre 
of this national narrative. That gave a sense of pride and inclusion of the 
periphery. The population of the German borderlands was thus attributed 
agency in the founding of the German nation-state. 
Benefiting fram the depoliticisation of regional identity the terminology 
of one people consisting of many tribes (ein Volk und viele Stämme) provided 
a way to express unity and diversity at the same time. The people or 'Volk' 
were the Germans, the tribes were the Saxons, the Bavarians, the Swabians, 
the Hessians and so on. The rhetoric of one people in many tribes expressed 
national unity among the different German regions. This concept found 
its iconographic expression in the German Reichstag, which was opened in 
1894. Its entrance showed the emblems of 20 different German tribes which 
represented the 25 German states and cities which formed the nation-state. 
The entrance of the Reichstag was surrounded by the heraldic mottos of the 
German kingdoms, such as 'Suum cuique' for Prussia, 'Providentiae memor' for 
Saxony or 'In Treue fest' for Bavaria. Expressing one's adherence to Germany 
and one's integrity as a graup through the Volk/Stamm rhetoric was so suc-
cessful that even some German ]ews described themselves as 'Germans of 
the Jewish Stamm'.24 
Referring to the Germanie tribes implied a historical appraach. The impact 
of historical thinking on regionalism in the German Empire can be best 
observed in the 1880s when the festivities for the anniversaries of the 
Bavarian and Saxon dynasties were used for the exhibition of liistorical 
loyalty totheGerman cause. 25 In 1880 the Munich liberal bourgeoisie cele-
brated the seven-hundredth anniversary of the Wittelsbach dynasty. Neither 
the dynasty nor the government took part due to the mental illness of 
Ludwig II and because of the general depoliticised character of the festivities. 
The monarchy was used rhetorically to express national Bavarian sentiments 
in various ways. For the Catholic bishops religion stood at the centre of the 
monarchical order, which had Iasted for so long. Their message was: only 
the Church could mediate between the people and the monarchy, as a cul-
turally pratective force that had enriched Bavaria for so long. Liberals looked 
at the 700 years quite differently. They placed Bavaria and its monarchy at 
the centre of German history fram its early stages. Nobody represented this 
invented tradition better than Ludwig the Bavarian, Holy Roman Emperor 
from 1328 to 1347.26 
In 1889 the Saxon Wettirrer dynasty celebrated its own anniversary; 
it had a hundred years more to commemorate. The eight-hundredth 
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.t1111iversary celebrations in Dresden portrayed Saxon regionalism as a force 
'>I modernisation already in the Middle Ages. Its procession of regional 
lltdustrialists dramatised the industrial pragress of the nineteenth century 
111 h istorical costumes. The resulting impression was that the present -day 
111anufacturers and industrialists in Saxony fulfilled a historical mission to 
I tri ng modernity to Germany. The organisers showcased the historical efforts 
.111d merits of Saxony in the modernisation of transport and communica-
t ion under the recurrent leitmotif of the anniversary: 'We Saxans were the 
11 rst .... ' 
The impression the festivities left behind was that the Wettiner dukes 
.111d emperars in the eleventh century represented - like the Wittelsbach 
'lynasty in Munich - Germany much earlier than the Hohenzollern in 
1\erlin did, an observation that was not lost on the audience at the Eibe, 
1 raditionally opposed to the house of Hohenzollern at the Spree. The direc-
tors of the festivities in Munich and Dresden considered their regions as 
( lerman long before some 'homines novi', the Hohenzollern in Prussia, rase 
lo praminence. Historical loyafty to the German nation had become a 
way to affirm regional identity tagether with national loyalty against the 
'·laims of a Prussian historiography that tended t6 highlight the Prussian 
st•rvice to the German nation.U The impact of festivities like these was that 
regionalism implied nationalism, and vice versa. Araund 1900, local trade 
lairs (Gewerbeaustellungen) presented their praducts in order to outdo their 
mmpetitors not just in artisanal and technical matters but also in national 
reputation. 
After 1900, nothing showed better the inclusionary logic of national-
ism towards regionalism than the rhetoric and cultural practice of Heimat, 
a ward that is so particularly German, that it can hardly be translated. 
C :elia Applegate and Alon Confino have shown the career of the cul-
1 ural practice associated with the Heimat movement in the Palatinate and 
in Württemberg.28 It started in the 1850s in the Palatinate and grew in 
1 he 1880s. Heimat associations, pamphlets and festivities began to express 
the particularities and the uniqueness of the regional enviranment in the 
national language. Being unique as a Pfälzer or Swabian did not contra-
dict being German. Quite the contrary: the Palatinate, a part of Bavaria, 
stood out in its nationalism agairrst the Catholic Bavarian patriots in 
Munich. If Munich did not want to be German, the Palatinate under the 
influence of the Heimat movement considered itself no Ionger as Bavarian. 
Similar to the concept of one people and many tribes the movement did not 
force its followers to choose between the nation and the region. 'National-
ism could embrace their smaller worlds; Germanness could encompass their 
diversity.'29 Before 1914, Heimat associations sprang up everywhere, partic-
ularly in those regions where industry was weak and migration high. Its 
emphasis on the local and presumably pre-modern Iifestyle also braught it in 
opposition to modernism. The Heimat movement bridged the gap between 
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the regions and the nation, but sharpened the conflict between modernism 
and anti-modernism within the national movement.30 
The impact of transport and social communication on 
regionalism 
Regional and national affiliations were also influenced by increased mobil-
ity and communication. Railways and postal services made communication, · 
transport and mobility much easier at ail Ievels. Crossing borders became 
common in 'Mitte/deutschland' as weil as in the Rhein-Main area with its 
many former states. The railways reaffirmed the role of the federal states 
since the governments not only built national networks, but since the Iate 
1870s also domestic and locallines (Nahverkehr). When the Iocal transporta- ' 
tion systems were in place in the 1880s, it became much easier to search 
for a job in a nearby town and maintain a family in a nearby village. That . 
became an alternative to migration and strengthened regionalloyalty. Traf-
fic and transport crossed borders between the old states, but also intensified 
traffic within the !arger states like Bavaria, Saxony or Württemberg and of 
course Prussia. 
The postal services were one of the very few decidedly unitary institu-
tions in the empire. The constitution of 1871 created an imperial post 
office. Outside Bavaria the postal services were reorganised on a unitary basis 
with headquarters in Berlin. Heinrich von Stephan, one of the most impor-
tant progressive liberal politicians and administrators of his time, attempted 
to make the Imperial Postal Services into a nation-building institution.31 
Stephan was also a convinced liberal free trader. Regional barriers to mobility 
and communication were abhorrent to him. The nationally unified postal 
service was in his eyes a first step towards an internationalism that would 
bring mankind to a higher qualitative Ievel of existence. Through intensified 
communication people would lose their prejudices and develop a cosmopoli- , 
tan spirit. His political arguments resonated even in Britain, where The Times 
wrote: 'Nothing is impossible with the German Postmaster-General.132 
Indeed the Imperial Postal Services developed a national infrastructure of 
communication. Modelied on the British penny post of 1840, the Northern ' 
Confederation and later the German Empire introduced a nationwide postal 
delivery service for one price. It became as cheap to communicate over a 
long distance as within one's own region. Up to then postage had been 
based on distance, according to an economic rationale. It had been much 
more expensive for Dresdeners to write a Ietter to Berlin than to Leipzig. 
After 1867 Prussia (and of course Berlin) was no Ionger a foreign country for 
Saxons. The administrative infrastructure, as weil as the system of collection 
and distribution of letters and postcards, was standardised and nationalised. 
Stephan became farnaus for his postal architecture. New imperial post houses 
were constructed throughout Germany. In many regions they were the only 
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111 •,I i lutions representing the nation-state. 33 Tagether with the other reforms 
llll''it' seemed tobring about a tangible utopia, in which space was abolished 
<111d l'Veryone was close to everyone else.34 
11111 this did not materialise. Indeed many more Germans wrote letters 
•llld communicated over long distances, butthat did not mean that the local 
l"'';l a I communication within a town, city or region lost importance - in 
1111 1 i 1 was strengthened. The increased communication on the nationallevel 
d1ws not provide proof for Karl W. Deutsch's concept of national assimila-
111111 and the disappearance of regional and linguistic diversity through social 
, llllllllUnication. Instead different Ievels of communicative networks and 
llf',l'llcies established themselves. The new infrastructure enabled increased 
l111 al, regional as weil as national communication; it did not dismantle 
l111 al and regional communication. The nation-state became a communica-
llvt• Ievel and fact of its own, just as locality and region already were and 
l1'lllained.35 The impact that social communication indeed had was that 
llll'se Ievels no Ionger existed independently from each other. Localism 
.111d regionalism were importandactors, but they no Ionger worked against 
11.1tionalism. As local transportation helped create mo're national transporta-
llon, so did local postal communication serve to create national networks of 
1 11111 munication. Allthese Ievels were intertwined in forms of mutual benefit, 
111111 ual exchange, assistance and participation. 
The consequence of social communication was not a unitary society, but 
.1 growing uniformity of political decision-making on the Ievels of the city, 
IIH • region and the nation-state. All Ievels were maintained, but intensified 
•,111 ·ial communication was crucial in ending particularism and transforming 
11 into nationaily compatible regionalism. Parliamentarism was not just a 
, l1aracteristic of the Reich or before that of the federal states. The adminis-
tra live reforms of the 1870s implemented a kind of parliamentarism in the 
dislricts andin the cities- even in the Prussian East, where the authoritarian 
1 1 1le of the nobility had to accept the constitutional principle of the division 
1 d powers between an elected body and the executive. Even local govern-
lnent in these near-feudal parts of Prussia obtained the two branches of a 
l1·gislative and an executive body after 1873. 
Transport and communication impacted in various other ways on the 
llt•velopment of regionalism and nationalism. The planning and construc-
1 ion of new cross-regional railway networks resulted in the creation of 
new traffic areas ('Verkehrsräume') that no Ionger coincided with regional 
horders. Such new regions were 'Westdeutschland', 'Süddeutschland' and 
'Norddeutschland', all based on railway networks. They mirrored less the 
political structure than the multicentred economic development with its 
various sub-state centres of industrialisation.36 Social communication also 
made it much easier to coordinate action between different places, a pre-
requisite to federalism and its stronger need for interstate coordination. 
1:urthermore it allowed for a strengthening of the infrastructural capacity of 
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regional governments that was crucial for the internal integration. 
and local social communication pravided some coherence to everyday 
within regional societies. The networks of railways and postal services 
part of the 'infrastructural capacity', which was, according to Daniel 
crucial for the fact that Germany with strang middle-sized regional 
developed into a federal state, whereas at about the same time Italy 
as many states but with less infrastructural capaeitles rejected a 
system.37 
Finally social communication thraugh its prapagandists was a 
endeavour. Whereas liberalism was generally identified with a unitary 
cept of the nation-state in order to resist what they perceived as """v.11u1 
autocracies, the general principle for integration underlying their ideas 
on the concepts of net and network building. The net was originally 
stood as the sum of the connections between one city and another. 
early railways connected cities and rarely stopped in between. Twenty 
after the founding of the German Empire, nets and networks meant som 
thing completely differently. The liberal economical concept bad given 
to a much more diverse and multi-centric net. The communicative noh'""'~"·• · 
araund 1900 were long as weil as short distance and even included local 
ones. It was much easier to travel to and fram Berlin, but the increased 
local transportation system also allowed workers to commute daily fram the 
countryside, where they lived, to the cities. Local and regional networks fed 
the national networks, since they connected travellers fram small villages 
and towns through a national network of railways and - after 1890 more , 
and more - the telegraph. The intertwining of regional and national com• 
municative networks thus bound the mechanics of nationalism to that of, 
regionalism. 
Timing and outlook 
Araund 1890 a new generation bad experienced more than 20 years of 
national and regional infrastructure building. The 1890 was a turning point 
for regionalism and nationalism in so far as regionalism no Ionger was the 
addressee of national politics, but rather mass politics and the rise of the 
SPD posed the new challenges. Regional and national elites in most cases 
worked together, particularly in fighting socialism. Mass politics was organ-
ised in national organisations. Ideologically they included regionalism, but 
their organisations were highly nationalised. This held true for national-
1st organisations like the Pan-German League as weil as for the leftist SPD. 
Generally regionalism came under pressure fram the new dynamics intro-
duced by mass politics and imperialism. The Navy League and the build-up 
of a navy was, for instance, particularly popular, and that automatically 
implied the national Ievel as landlocked Bavaria or Saxony did not possess 
a navy. 
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II we Iook at the twentieth century, the mwst important challenge to 
''')',ionalism came fram the rise of the welfare s.tate, which gave the national 
'onrnnunity a new dimension. Whereas liberatl constitutionalism, Prussian 
•I••••• i nance and the determinationnottobe dissolved into a German nation-
·.l.rll' created a working relationship between Jiegions and the nation-state, 
1111· social question and the welfare state required national institutions and 
11111 new pressures on federalism. Universal social rights were intraduced in 
1111• I R80s to Iure the workers away fram the socialist party. These social 
rlglr t s did not make regional distinctions. Whereas Germany bad 25 fed-
,.,,rl states, it bad only a single welfare state. The early years oftheGerman 
l'.nrpire had laid the base for this welfare state, when the poor laws no 
lonrger made the city of birth but the city of residence responsible for 
1•.ryments in case of sickness or disablement. Social rights went with the 
w• 1rkers wherever they settled. They were designed to transcend regional 
lliriTiers. 
Social rights and political regionalism were therefore more at odds with 
t•;rch other than nationalism a.nd regionalism were. 'Social reform estab-
llshed a new administrative domain for the central state, it established the 
•rt•t>d for a new bureaucratic apparatus, and it pramised to open up new 
.,, Hl rces of revenue for the Reich .... Bismarck's sociallegislation bad a strang 
.r1rli-federalist momentum.'38 The 31 administrative units of the regional 
lrrsurance offices did not correspond with state boundaries. The centrali-
o;ation of the welfare state became even stranger in 1911, when a single 
national insurance for white-collar employees ('Angestelltenversicherung') was 
i 11 troduced. In the same year more than 20,000 regional funds were reor-
ganlsed in appraximately 10,000 national fumds on similar lines to the 
whlte-collar insurance. The centralising impact of the welfare state was made 
t•vident in 1927 when under unemployed insurance a single central agency 
with 13 regional sub-branches replaced 22 state and 869 municipal agen-
l'ies.39 It is therefore no coincidence that the post-war Weimar Republic was 
not only much more developed in social poliicy, it was also a much more 
unitary state than the German Empire. 
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